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and also gave an iterative algoritbm for computing it.
3. If the cost functions l~ are idenoical anù the
d t O Op . t h E B Lrl] provedcon i iona of • ~'Z are satisfied, t en • urger
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point and also
gave an algoritbm to compute it. ',7e remark that the algorithm
of Szidarovszky is a generalization of Burger's method.
4. If the functions f and Kk (k=1,2, ••• ,n) are linear,
then the existence and uniqueness was proved by li. Matias,[4] •
who gave an algoritbm which is independent of th~ method of
Szidarovszky. ~e remark that using the result of Theorem 5.
the equilibrium point in this special case can be given in
closed form (see pp. 37-39 of [lOJ).
iJ The group eguilibrium problem
In this paragraph we will discuss the general~zed version
of the classical oligopoly game r having the srategy sets
and pay-off functions
••• (l f k ~ n) (25)
•~k
~ x"L K~
i=l
,
n ~-t
f L LX{j
.(. =1 j=l
(26)
where for k=1,2, ••• ,n'!k = (Xkl"",xkik) E~ • This game
can oeeur when the players of the classical oligopoly game
fom disjoint groups and they tend to the optimal income of
the group. If the number of members in group k is equal to
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and the capacity limit of member i of group k is given by
~i' then the strategy set of group k is the set ~ and the
income of group k is the sum of the individual incomes of its
members, given by the function (26). i
k ,
Far k=l,2, ••• ,n and sk ~ O, ~I~i consider the
i=l
problem
lk
L ~i = Sk
i=l
(i=1,2, ••• ,ik )
(27)
•-~:> lIUn.
If function K is continuous then problem (27) has an optimal
solution. Let the optimal objective function value be denoted
by 9k (sk)' Some properties of the functions
in the following lemma.
Qk are given
Lemma 10. If K is continùo~t convex and strictly
increasing in the components of ~) then ~k is continuous,
convex and strictly increasing in sk'
Preof. See Lemmas 2,),4 of the paper [10).
•
Remark. Observe that the aame properties were assumed
in the main theorems of the previous section which are now
stated in this lemma.
-'
Let us now consider the classical oligopoly game r with
sete of strategies
and pa,y-off functions
- )0 -
•~k
O, L' ~i
i=l
(k=l, 2, ••• ,n) (28)
n
fk(Sl""'Sn) = sk f L St - ~(Sk)'
f,=l
(29)
The connection between the generalized game (25), (26) and
the classical oligopoly game (28), (29) is shown in the
following theor'em.
·Theorem 6. Assume that !Se is continuous for k=1,2, ••• ,n.
al let ~H = (~~' ""~) (~= (X~r ••• 'X~ik)) be an
equilibrium point of r, and let s~ = i:: X~i • Then
i=l
'"(s~' ••• ,s:) is an equilibrium point of r and for k=1,2, ••• ,n
(~l""'X~i ) is an optimal solution of problem (27) with
k
li
sk = ~ •
'"bi let (s~, ••• ,s:) be an equilibrium point of r and
let ~ = (~l"" '~i ) be an optimal solution of problem
k
(27) with sk = s;. Then (~~""'~) gives an equilibrium
point of game r .
Praof. See lemma l. of papar [lO].
Remark. The gx-oup equilibrium problem is not a real
generalization of the classical oligopoly game, since it can
be reduced to the classical case.
Pinally let as assume that the functions f and !Se are
•
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linear. Let
f(s) = As + B
•~k
\: (!.k) = L ~i X ki + bk '
i=l
then the solution of the optimization pr~blem (27) is a
piece-wise linear' function Qk • In this case the reduced game
can be solved easily as i t is shown in [lOJ, pp. 43-44 •
•5. Multiproduct oligopoly game
In this paragraph we will consider the game having the
sets of strategies
~ = [o, ~CLlJ
end pa.y-off functions
x ••• x (30 )
n
L xP) ,••• ,
{,=l
(31)
where (
ll) lM))~ = Xk '···'Xk '
n n
9 Cfm) = 0, L ri-1) x ••• x 0, L: LiMl , R(fm)CRl for
t=l e=1
k=1,2 •••• ,n and 1Il=1 , 2, •• , M. This game can come up if the
factories manufacture differ~nt p~ducts and sell them on the
same market. Let M be the number of products, and 1et x~m) ,
~) be the p~duction level and capacity limit of factory k
f~m p~duct m. If f donotes the unit price of p~duct m, than
m
it is assumed that f is a function of the total production
m
levels of the different products. The function Y~ is tbe
